

Topic 11: Side Channels, Meltdown, and Spectre, Oh My!



ECE 4750 Computer Architecture

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Based on slides by D. Zagieboylo, M. Hill, K. Sekniqi

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Side Channels

- An *extra* way to learn information about a program's execution
- Usually a way for an *attacker* to bypass security mechanisms



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Side Channels

- An *extra* way to learn information about a program's execution
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- Power consumption
- Electromagnetic Radiation
- Responsiveness / Faults
- Timing



- Timing attacks are a **BIG** concern:

- Can be executed remotely
- Hard to prevent all secret-dependent timing
- Small differences can be amplified with repetition
- Very *stealthy*

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Timing Side Channels

What influences a program's execution time?



- Dynamic instruction count
 - Which branches get executed
- Cycles per instruction
 - Variable latency instructions (e.g., division)
 - TLB Hit or Miss (Page Fault)
 - Cache Hit or Miss
 - Correct vs. Incorrect Speculation
- Clock frequency
 - DVFS (Dynamic Voltage-Frequency Scaling)

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Cache Timing Channel

- very common side channel
 - Fast/easy to execute
 - High signal to noise (don't have to repeat much to be sure it worked)

How it works: Prime + Probe:

1. Setup cache state
2. Run victim
3. Time memory accesses

“Which cache set did the victim access?”

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Prime + Probe Example

```
//Attacker: (e.g., user process)
char arr[N_CACHE_SETS*LINE_SIZE];
for (int i = 0; i < N_CACHE_SETS; i++) {
    arr[i*LINE_SIZE] = 0; ←
```

Cache is now completely filled with attacker's array.

idx	Tag
63	&arr[63]
62	&arr[62]
61	&arr[61]
...	...
2	&arr[0]
1	&arr[1]
0	&arr[0]

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Prime + Probe Example

```
//Attacker: (e.g., user process)
char arr[N_CACHE_SETS*LINE_SIZE];
for (int i = 0; i < N_CACHE_SETS; i++) {
    arr[i*LINE_SIZE] = 0;
}
//Call Victim Code (e.g., via syscall)
...
victim[secret] = data; ←
```

idx	Tag
63	&arr[63]
62	&arr[62]
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Prime + Probe Example

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//Attacker: (e.g., user process)
char arr[N_CACHE_SETS*LINE_SIZE];
for (int i = 0; i < N_CACHE_SETS; i++) {
    arr[i*LINE_SIZE] = 0;
}
//Call Victim Code (e.g., via syscall)
...
victim[secret] = data;
...
//Return to Attacker:
for (int i = 0; i < N_CACHE_SETS; i++) {
    time_start();
    arr[i*LINE_SIZE] = 0; ←
    time_end();
}
```

idx	Tag	
63	&arr[63]	Hit
62	&arr[62]	Hit
61	&arr[61]	MISS
...	...	
2	&arr[0]	Hit
1	&arr[1]	Hit
0	&arr[0]	Hit

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Prime + Probe Example

Cache Hit (Fast!)

- Victim was not here

Cache MISS (Slow)

- Attacker learns **index bits** of secret memory address

&victim[secret] is 0x???3d??

Can be helpful:

- if you already know &victim
- or if you only need to limit the number of possibilities for secret

idx	Tag	
63	&arr[63]	Hit
62	&arr[62]	Hit
61	&arr[61]	MISS
...	...	
2	&arr[0]	Hit
1	&arr[1]	Hit
0	&arr[0]	Hit

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Cache Timing Channels

In reality, more complicated

- Multi-level caches
- Associativity
- Hardware Prefetchers
- Virtual Memory (Address Translation)
- Non-secret memory accesses (noise)

Can still execute \$ timing attacks

- Reverse Engineering of HW
- Repeated execution of attack
- Statistical analysis
- Other attacks (e.g., Flush+Reload)

Solutions?

- ❗ Add more noise (you'll lose the arms race usually)

- Partition Cache (doesn't help if victim & attacker are in same user-space process - costs efficiency)

- Avoid secret-dependent LW/SW (hard (or impossible) to do)

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Recent Events – Transient Execution Attacks

- 2018

- Meltdown & Spectre – [Jann Horn, Google Project Zero]

Also, independently, Paul Kocher

- Both are *microarchitectural attacks* that allow the user to exploit **speculative execution** to learn secret data

- Make \$ timing channels super easy to exploit – nearly NO statistical analysis necessary, can pick *any address you want to leak*

- Meltdown affects almost every Intel chip made since 1995, and some ARM chips
- Spectre affects Everychip, Everywhere, All at once.

- Intel® pushes out several microcode (HW) patches that...don't work and cause BSOD

- OS, Compiler & Browser Mitigations (KPTI, SLH, Retpoline) start to be rolled out


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Meltdown and Spectre: 'worst ever' CPU bugs affect virtually all computers

Everything from smartphones and PCs to cloud computing affected by major security flaw found in Intel and other processors - and fix could slow devices

© Spectre and Meltdown processor security flaws - ex



The sky is falling again: Meltdown and Spectre

Published on January 5, 2018

John Jiang • Fellow
Director of IT Operations Security at SAP
7 articles

The Register
Bringing the World and South of

DATA CENTER SOFTWARE SECURITY DEVOPS BUSINESS PERSONAL TECH SCIENCE EN

Security Meltdown/Spectre week three: World still knee-deep in something nasty

And years away from safety

By Simon Sturges, APAC Editor 22 Jan 2018 at 04:31

It is now almost three weeks since The Register revealed the chip design flaws that Google later confirmed and the world still awaits certainty about what it will take to get over the silicon slip-up.

The short version: on balance, some steps forward have been taken but last week didn't offer many useful advances.

In the "plus" column, Microsoft and AMD got their act together to resume the flow of working fixes. Vendors started to offer tools to manage the chore of fixing the twin flaws, such as VMware's dashboard kit for its vRealize Operations automation tools.

Typing

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Recent Events – Transient Execution Attacks

- 2018
 - **Meltdown** & **Spectre** – [Jann Horn, Google Project Zero] Also, independently, Paul Kocher
- 2019
 - **Spectre Variants** (Speculative Store Bypass, Foreshadow, Zombieload) continue to haunt us
 - Numerous *new microarchitectural designs to avoid Spectre* are proposed at high profile research conferences
 - No new word from Intel, AMD, ARM, etc. on *Spectre-secure* designs
- 2020-2022
 - **Even more Spectre attacks. Old defenses broken. New defenses proposed. Repeat.**



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Recent Events – Transient Execution Attacks

- 2018
 - **Meltdown** & **Spectre** – [Jann Horn, Google Project Zero] Also, independently, Paul Kocher
- 2018-19
 - OS patches for **Meltdown** released
 - Chipmakers plan to fix **Meltdown** in future HW
 - SW patches for **Spectre_v1** & **v2** developed. Mostly unused outside Google Chrome & Cryptographic libraries
- 2020-2022
 - Spectre patches gain more traction, incorporated into LLVM
 - More variants discovered, highlights need for new design, not just adhoc patches
 - Still an open problem, the attack-defense vicious cycle continues.



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
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Background on Memory space

The virtual address space of each process contains **user-level memory** and **OS memory**.

This is convenient for handling exceptions and making system calls (just change to privileged mode and start fetching **OS code**).

User-level process cannot load from OS memory. This is a permission violation.



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Background on Memory Checks

```
x = *target_addr; // user-level code
```

→ TLB detects illegal memory violation

→ instruction will throw an exception


→ seg fault kills the process. **WHEN does detection & suppression happen??**

EARLY: AMD seems to suppress at TLB access

LATE: Intel seems to suppress *after* cache access

• Architectural state not changed

• **Micro-architectural state is changed!** 🐱




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Meltdown – In Detail

Dynamically Scheduled Processors

- Fetch & Decode instructions in order
- Execute Out-of-Order
- Commit In-Order




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Meltdown – In Detail

Dynamically Scheduled Processors

2) Squash all these instructions




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Meltdown – In Detail

Meltdown Vulnerability

- Illegal Memory Load **still touches \$**
- If illegal load is ultimately **squashed**, process gets to keep running (no segfault)



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
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Meltdown – In Detail

Meltdown Vulnerability

- Illegal Memory Load **still touches \$**
- If illegal load is ultimately **squashed**, process gets to keep running (no segfault)

1. `syscall();` ← causes PC+4 etc. to be squashed
2. `x = *target_addr;` ← Executes OoO, value available in bypass network
3. `y = probe[x*4096];` ← dependent load updates \$
4. //another thread executes \$ timing attack (prime+probe) to learn some bits of `x`




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Meltdown Consequences

- User process can *easily* read *all of OS Memory at up to 500KB/s*
- Solution: *unmap most of OS memory from PT*
 - Syscalls take longer to handle
 - Trap to OS
 - Trap handler loads OS page table, **flushes TLB**
 - Handle trap
 - Loads User page table, **flushes TLB**
 - Return to User
- 5% overhead most programs
- 30% for syscall-heavy programs



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Spectre in 1 Slide

```

unsigned int a;
if (a < xarray_len) {
    // Should only execute if x[a] is in bounds
    b = x[a];
    z = *b;
}

```



Bounds-check-bypass

- Extremely common check
- *Speculation* allows body to temporarily execute when $a \geq xarray_len$
- Speculative execution modifies \$ state (just like meltdown)
- Attacker can read arbitrary (user space) memory via \$ timing channel

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software &
hardware fixes exist



scary

both leak data through \$ timing channel

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exploits out-of-order execution after exceptions • Illegal memory accesses after an exception still update \$ • Breaks <i>Kernel Isolation</i>: Allows <i>user process</i> to read any part of <i>OS's memory</i> (if mapped) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exploits <i>speculative execution across branches</i> • Attacker manipulates branch predictor to speculatively execute target instructions • Breaks <i>software sandboxing</i>: Allows <i>user process</i> to violate <i>application-level</i> isolation (within a single process) |
|--|--|

Miessler Blog (<https://danielmiessler.com/blog/simple-explanation-difference-meltdown-spectre/>)

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Takeaways for Computer Architects

Architecture: timing-independent functional behavior of a computer
Micro-architecture: implementation techniques to ↑ performance

These choices have consequences!

What if a computer that is **architecturally correct** can leak protected information via its **micro-architecture**?

Perhaps our definition of "**architecturally correct**" needs re-thinking...

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Some References

New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/business/computer-flaws.html>

Meltdown paper: <https://meltdownattack.com/meltdown.pdf>

Spectre paper: <https://spectreattack.com/spectre.pdf>

A blog separating the two bugs: <https://danielmiessler.com/blog/simple-explanation-difference-meltdown-spectre/>

Google Blog: <https://security.googleblog.com/2018/01/todays-cpu-vulnerability-what-you-need.html> and <https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html>

Industry News Sources: <https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2018/01/whats-behind-the-intel-design-flaw-forcing-numerous-patches/> and https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/02/intel_cpu_design_flaw/

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